

















4.2.1 Doctors’ pay and gratuities
János Köllő
Official pay in the health sector is low by any stand-
ards and it even declined substantially during the 
crisis. As it is shown by Figure B4.2.1 graduate pro-
fessionals in the sector – predominantly doctors – 
were earning significantly less already in 2008, than 
graduates with similar education and age employed 
in the private sector. Similarly to other graduates in 
the public sector, the gap was widest at the age of 
35–40 years for doctors as well – on average 43%. 
As a result of the abolition of the 13th month pay 
and other measures, the gap increased to 51 per 
cent in this cohort by May 2010. At the same time 
the (official) relative pay of the most highly paid 
doctors – those aged over 55 – dropped even more 
drastically: from 90 per cent to 70 per cent.
Figure B4.2.1: Monthly gross pay of graduates  
in the health care sector expressed as a percentage 
of monthly gross pay of graduates in the private 
sector, May 2008, 2010 and 2013
Source: Wage Tariff Survey, 2008, 2010 and 2013. 
Moving means by three years.
Between May 2010 and 2013 the pay of doctors 
aged under 40 years increased by around seven or 
eight percentage points, however the pay of older 
doctors declined even further with the exception of 
those near retirement. The selection bias resulting 
from the increased exit of low-paid older employees 
might have also paid a role in this. Even now, doc-
tors aged 40 earn no more than half of what their 
counterparts in the private sector are paid.
A distinctive feature of the struggle of doctors 
and nurses for higher pay in Hungary has been its 
initial link to the fight against gratuities. Although 
patients across Eastern Europe and in some South-
ern European countries routinely pay gratuities for 
health care (see e.g. the paper by Chawla, Berman 
and Kawiorska, 1998 on Poland, Delcheva, Bala-
banova and McKee’s 1997 on Bulgaria, Sabiriano-
va and Zelenska’s 2011 study on Russia, Burak and 
Vian’s 2007 research on Albania and Liaropoulos et 
al. 2008 report on Greece), but as far as we know, 
only in the Hungarian “pay movement” the idea of 
replacing gratuities with higher pay was put for-
ward in the past years. The Hungarian Resident 
Association started the “green cross” movement at 
the end of 2010. Doctors supporting the movement 
would have given up gratuities for a 100 per cent 
pay rise (they would have expressed their support 
to the movement by wearing a green cross badge). 
However, the proposal was against the interest of 
older doctors benefitting from gratuities and there-
fore, with pressure from professional bodies (Hun-
garian Medical Council, Hungarian Medical As-
sociation, Association of Hospitals), it was rapidly 
taken off the agenda of pay negotiations.
There are various obstacles to tackling gratui-
ties. Firstly, the opposition of senior doctors should 
be expected because it is unlikely that official pay 
would be brought into line with actual pay that in-
cludes gratuities, which widely vary with age, rank 
and field of practice.
Secondly, replacing gratuities with pay would 
also have major budgetary implications: Bognár, 
Gál and Kornai (1999) estimated annual gratuity 
payments at 33 billion forints in the early 1990s, 
Szinapszis Ltd at 45 billion forints in 2008, and Pa-
tika Health Fund at 73 billion in 2009.*
* The last figure was considered exaggerated by experts 
of Szinapszis Ltd, see Kiss (2009).
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Last but not least, the reluctance of tax payers 
should also be considered: although they would 
happily get rid of the burden of gratuity payments 
and they overwhelmingly support a major pay rise 
for doctors,** at the same time over 80 per cent of 
voters rejected co-payment (a small fee for medi-
cal consultations and a daily fee for hospital stays) 
on top of social insurance contributions to create 
additional funding for health care – among oth-
ers, to combat gratuity payment – at a referendum 
in 2008. Since Fidesz – who initiated the referen-
dum – came to government, the introduction of any 
general co-payment scheme is very unlikely. In the 
current context, demand and supply of gratuities 
can be reduced by additional government spend-
ing and the introduction of new taxes (such as the 
“hamburger tax”), or by supplementary insurance 
and additional fee-paying services. Obviously, the 
last two can only provide a solution for the better-
off upper- and middle classes for whom the “obli-
gation” of gratuity payment is a lesser burden an-
yway (Szende and Culyer, 2006). Pay agreements 
that set out a gradual increase of wages signed in 
2012–2013 created a necessary but insufficient con-
dition to tackle the issue of gratuity: competitive 
and fair pay, and a health care sector free from gra-
tuity payment are no longer as interconnected as 
in the original programme of the Hungarian Resi-
dent Association.
** According to a survey by Szinapszis Ltd 88 per cent 
of the population would support the pay increase 
of health care workers. One third of the population 
would consider a 50 per cent rise fair, and 11 per cent 
would double pay (Nógrádi Tóth, 2010).
References
Bognár L., Gál R. I. and Kornai J. (1999): Hálapénz 
a magyar egészségügyben. (Gratuities in the Hungar-
ian health care system) Tárki Társadalompolitikai 
Tanulmányok, 17.
Burak, L. J. and Vian, T. (2007): Examining and 
predicting under-the-table payments for health care 
in Albania: An application of the theory of planned 
behavior. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, Vol. 
37,. No. 5, pp. 1060–1076.
Chawla, M., Berman, P. and, Kawiorska, D. (1998): 
Financing health services in Poland: New evidence on 
private expenditures. Health Economics, Vol. 7, No. 
4, pp. 337–346.
Delcheva, E., Balabanova, D. and McKee, M. 
(1997): Under-the-counter payments for health care: 
Evidence from Bulgaria. Health Policy, Vol. 42, No. 2, 
pp. 89–100.
Kiss Katalin (2009): Gondolatok a hálapénzről. Egy 
kutatás margójára. Közös felelősség az orvos-be-
teg kapcsolat javítása és a bizalom helyreállítása. 
(Thoughts on gratuity payment. On the margins of a 
research study. Improving the doctor-patient relation-
ship and restoring trust is a joint responsibility). Szi-
napszis Kft.,
Liaropoulos, L., Kaitelidou, D., Theodorou, M. 
and Katostaras, T. (2008): Informal payments in 
public hospitals in Greece, Health Policy, Vol. 87, No. 
1, pp. 72–81..
Nógrádi Tóth, E. (2010): Nő az orvos- és ápolóhiány. 
(Shortage of doctors and nurses on the rise). Világ-
gazdaság Online, augusztus 6. 
Sabirianova-Peter, K. and T. Zelenska (2011): 
The price of the Hippocratic oath: determinants of 
bribery in Russian health care’, Paper presented at the 
IZA/World Bank Workshop Institutions and Infor-
mal Employment in Emerging and Transition Econo-
mies, IZA, Bonn, 9–11 June.
Szende, A. and Culyer, A. J. (2006): The inequity of 
informal payments for health care: the case of Hun-
gary. Health Policy, Vol. 75, No. 3, pp. 262–271.
